Against the backdrop of the US-Israeli war on Iran, which began on the morning of February 28, 2026, and the accompanying tightening of restrictive measures in East Jerusalem, notable shifts have emerged regarding al-Aqsa Mosque and the rest of Jerusalem’s Old City. These include the closure of markets and restrictions on worshippers’ access to enter al-Haram al-Sharif, resulting in thousands of people opting to pray outside the city’s walls and in the city streets.

What are the implications of these developments? How can we interpret what is happening at al-Aqsa Mosque today, and what might the future bring?

To address these and other questions, Jerusalem Story spoke with Palestinian writer, researcher, and human rights activist Saher Ghazawi of the Meezan Organization for Human Rights in Nazareth. A native of Nazareth, Ghazawi is regarded as a leading scholar on issues related to Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque.

The conversation, which took place on March 14, 2026, has been edited for clarity and length.

Jerusalem Story (JS): We notice that restrictions are clearly concentrated on al-Aqsa Mosque and the Old City markets, while other mosques in Jerusalem remain open. How can this disparity be explained?

Saher Ghazawi (SG): First, it is important to recall that East Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque have been under Israeli occupation since 1967. Over these decades, Israeli authorities have adopted a range of policies to control the city and the area surrounding the mosque. In this context, many of the measures imposed on al-Aqsa Mosque are viewed with suspicion and mistrust, even when justified on security or public safety grounds.

This perception is reinforced by the fact that current restrictions are mainly targeting al-Aqsa Mosque and the Old City markets, while other mosques remain open, and life continues relatively normally in other areas frequented by Jewish communities in the rest of the city, including sites that host large gatherings.

This uneven application of restrictions raises questions about the criteria [and intention] behind these measures. It reinforces the impression that al-Aqsa Mosque is subject to exceptional policies unlike any other site.

JS: To what extent can the closure of Old City markets and restrictions on entry to al-Aqsa Mosque be seen as war-related security measures, as opposed to an extension of longer-term policies aimed at reshaping reality in Jerusalem?

SG: While these measures are typically justified by wartime security concerns, it is difficult to view them in isolation from the broader context that has been unfolding in Jerusalem over recent years. The Old City and the area around al-Aqsa Mosque have witnessed a continuous series of restrictive measures, including tighter movement restrictions, increased security deployment, and new on-the-ground arrangements at gates, markets, and roads leading to the mosque.

With their repeated implementation, these measures have formed a cumulative pattern that affects both access to the area and the very fabric of daily life within the Old City. As such, what is happening today can be understood not only as a wartime security response but also as part of a long-term process aimed at reorganizing the space around al-Aqsa Mosque and imposing a new reality.

JS: Can it be said that what is happening reflects an attempt to isolate al-Aqsa Mosque from its natural Palestinian surroundings in the Old City? How does this manifest in practice?

SG: The measures imposed around al-Aqsa Mosque directly affect its organic relationship with the Old City. The closure of markets, coupled with the tightening of checkpoints and restrictions on movement and entry, all limit the ability of worshippers, traders, and residents to access the area as they once did.

In practice, this weakens the daily connection between al-Aqsa Mosque and its Palestinian surroundings. Market activity declines, and the social and economic life of the Old City is disrupted. Over time, this reshapes patterns of presence in the area and alters the broader environment around the mosque, which has historically been closely tied to the vibrant life of the Old City and its residents.

JS: Historically, periods of tension are often accompanied by stricter measures at al-Aqsa Mosque. Do current policies differ from those seen in previous escalations?

SG: Heightened restrictions during times of tension are nothing new; previous rounds of escalation have seen similar measures around al-Aqsa Mosque. What stands out in recent years, however, is that each phase introduces new restrictions that didn’t exist before, which gradually become part of the established reality on the ground.

The current period is particularly worrying given the presence of a government that includes hardline religious and nationalist factions, some of whose figures openly express their desire to change the Status Quo at al-Aqsa Mosque, even publicly floating ideas about building the [Third Jewish] Temple in its place [see What Is the Status Quo?]. This political climate forces us to view the measures on the ground as part of a broader context that extends beyond immediate security considerations.

JS: How would you characterize the Israeli authorities’ treatment of al-Aqsa Mosque during the war compared to their handling of other places of worship?

SG: The approach to al-Aqsa Mosque appears to differ from that applied to other places of worship. Israeli authorities treat it as a highly sensitive security and political issue, often imposing stricter measures in terms of access and the scale of security deployment compared to other religious sites.

This reflects al-Aqsa Mosque’s unique position in the struggle over Jerusalem. It is not merely a place of worship but a central site at the intersection of the religious, national, and political dimensions of the Palestinian cause. Its location in the heart of the Old City, and its symbolic significance for Palestinians, make it an especially sensitive flashpoint in the eyes of Israeli authorities, which explains the exceptional measures typically imposed in its vicinity.

JS: As we approach Jewish Passover, calls for incursions by Temple groups typically intensify. How do you expect the police to handle al-Aqsa Mosque during this period?

SG: During such sensitive periods, particularly around Jewish holidays, tensions in and around al-Aqsa Mosque tend to rise. Temple groups actively campaign to intensify incursions, using these occasions to push for a greater presence inside the mosque's courtyards. These calls often translate into additional pressure on the ground, heightening friction, and sensitivity in the area.

In response, the police are expected to increase their presence at the gates of al-Aqsa Mosque and throughout the Old City, while imposing additional restrictions on Palestinian worshippers, which include entry quotas, age limits, and stringent security checks. This is part of an effort to manage the situation on the ground and facilitate settler incursions during this period, while trying to minimize direct confrontation inside the mosque’s courtyards.

JS: Do you expect broader access to the mosque for settler incursions while restrictions on Muslim worshippers continue? What political messages might this carry?

SG: There are indications that incursions may expand amid the ongoing restrictions on Muslim worshippers [see Israel Is Banning More and More Palestinian Figures from Entering al-Aqsa Mosque on Arbitrary Grounds]. Policies such as bans from the mosque, arrests, and restrictions on access to Jerusalem, alongside age limits and strict security measures, effectively reduce the number of Palestinian worshippers. At the same time, the groups carrying out these incursions are granted increasing facilitation under police protection.

This reality carries clear political implications, suggesting an effort to gradually shift the balance of presence within al-Aqsa Mosque and create a new reality by shrinking the Muslim presence while expanding that of settler groups seeking to entrench themselves there.

Over time, such changes on the ground may be used to justify new arrangements regarding the management of the mosque and the way it’s administered.

JS: In your view, could this trajectory lead to gradual changes in the Status Quo at al-Aqsa Mosque, or are there limits Israel cannot currently cross?

SG: What is happening at al-Aqsa Mosque suggests that changes are often introduced gradually through small, incremental measures that accumulate over time, turning what was once exceptional into a normalized reality.

There is concern that the continuation of these policies could lead to substantive changes in the Status Quo. In the absence of political, international, or even grassroots pressure capable of curbing these trends, the door remains open for new realities to be gradually imposed in and around the mosque.

JS: Given the recent scenes of worshippers praying outside Jerusalem’s walls, do you think this movement could expand and consolidate, or might it fade over time, especially in the absence of clear leadership in the city?

SG: There is no doubt that the Palestinian reality today is extremely complex. The devastating war on Gaza, which brought scenes of widespread destruction, along with ongoing violations in the West Bank—including arrests, raids, and settler attacks, as well as policies of Judaization and settlement expansion—all place immense strain on Palestinian society. Palestinians inside Israel also face additional challenges related to organized crime and its social and security repercussions.

Nevertheless, al-Aqsa Mosque has long held a unique place in Palestinian consciousness, with a historical capability of mobilizing public sentiment and redirecting attention toward Jerusalem.

Movements related to al-Aqsa Mosque do not necessarily depend on a clear centralized leadership; they often emerge spontaneously from grassroots momentum, with community leaders stepping in later to support and organize them. As long as al-Aqsa Mosque remains central in public awareness, these movements have the potential to grow.

JS: Despite restrictions, Palestinians from within the State of Israel insist on going to Jerusalem and praying alongside fellow Palestinian Jerusalemites. What is the significance of that?

SG: Palestinians inside Israel have long been an integral part of the efforts to support al-Aqsa Mosque. They are aware of their role and responsibility and have played a prominent part in many key moments of the struggle over the mosque in recent years, whether through pilgrimage or mobilization.

Their determination to travel to Jerusalem and pray alongside fellow Jerusalemites, despite restrictions, reflects the continuity of this connection and sense of responsibility. Their presence strengthens the broader movement related to al-Aqsa Mosque and sends a message of solidarity to Jerusalemites that they are not alone.

JS: Considering the current developments, what are the possible scenarios for the future management of al-Aqsa Mosque in the coming months?

SG: Recent developments suggest that Israeli authorities are gradually working to reduce the role of the Islamic Waqf Department in managing al-Aqsa Mosque and to strip it of its remaining powers, even if some are largely symbolic. Although this role may sometimes appear limited, it remains important, as it represents one of the few remaining barriers to full Israeli control over the mosque. One possible scenario is the continuation of gradual efforts to weaken and marginalize the Waqf Department, thereby paving the way for new arrangements in the management of the mosque and its surroundings.

JS: Given the war and increasing restrictions, how do you see the future relationship between Jerusalemites and al-Aqsa Mosque? Could this phase lead to new shifts in the nature of the struggle over this site?

SG: The relationship between Jerusalemites and al-Aqsa Mosque is not a product of current circumstances; it is a deep-rooted historical bond shaped over many decades through religious, national, and human ties to the site.