Introduction
Credit:
Awad Awad/AFP via Getty Images
East Jerusalem after 59 Years of Israeli Military, Administrative, and Legal Occupation: A Roundtable
Snapshot
A group of Palestinian Jerusalemites reflect on the impact of 59 years of Israeli military, administrative, and legal occupation on their city—past, present, and future. From housing, education, and religious life to socioeconomic status, cultural practice, and collective identity, this Roundtable sheds light on the lives of Palestinians of Jerusalem and sources of hope for the future.
The following is a text of a Jerusalem Story Roundtable discussion that took place on Zoom on June 27, 2026, not long after the 59th anniversary of the occupation of East Jerusalem by Israel.
Participants were all Palestinian Jerusalemites:
Credit:
Jerusalem Story
Khalil Assali: Editor in chief, Akhbar elBalad Network; publisher; member, Jerusalem Waqf Council; writer, Jerusalem Story
Rania Elias: Former director, Yabous Cultural Centre and the Jerusalem Festival (1998–2022); member, various public bodies of local and international organizations; women’s rights activist; cultural heritage preserver
Ziad Hammouri: Director, the Jerusalem Center for Social and Economic Rights (JCSER)
Tony Khashram: Former president, the Holy Land Incoming Tour Operators Association; certified tourism consultant and tourism expert
The Roundtable was organized and moderated by journalist Daoud Kuttab for Jerusalem Story.
Participants’ remarks express their own views and not necessarily those of any organizations with which they are affiliated.
Roundtable
The Roundtable was framed around the fundamental question of whether an occupied population can preserve its identity and plan for its future under oppression and subjugation. From housing, education, and religious life to socioeconomic status, cultural practice, and collective identity, this Roundtable sheds light on the realities of life for Palestinians in Jerusalem, who comprise an estimated 40 percent of the city’s population (see Population of Jerusalem as of the End of 2023).
Ziad Hammouri set the tone by describing how Israeli legal and administrative systems have penetrated daily life for Palestinians since the June 1967 War.
In his view, the most significant consequence was the normalization of occupation through law—turning unilateral annexation into a permanent reality. He emphasized that Jerusalemites encounter Israeli systems early and constantly.
For Hammouri, the existential stakes are not only political; they are about the continued ability of Palestinians to live in the city. He warned that while people endured occupation through decades of resilience, the nature of the pressure has changed for the worse.
Rania Elias expanded on the human impact of the legal status granted to Palestinian by Israel. She described how Palestinians in Jerusalem were transformed from being residents who belong to their city into a population whose status can be revoked.
She noted the political consequences of the 1980 Basic Law declaring Jerusalem Israel’s capital. The most devastating mechanism, she explains, is administrative conditionality—residency that can be revoked.
Elias connected this to urban planning and education, highlighting ongoing Israeli municipal expansion that enables land confiscation and discriminatory building regimes.
She observed that Israel’s policies of Judaization and Israelization are attempts to systematically change the city’s national and cultural identity through erasure. She further described a multidimensional assault on Palestinian Jerusalem. While Gaza represents the visible horror of genocide, Elias argued that Jerusalem faces a “soft genocide” through incremental transformation—cultural, religious, educational, economic, and spatially.
She called for prioritizing culture.
Khalil Assali focused on Israel’s evolving approach to religious sites in the holy city. He described how Israel relied for decades on the Status Quo arrangement regarding worship at holy sites, including al-Aqsa Mosque, but that the year 2000 marked an important shift when “Ariel Sharon entered al-Aqsa Mosque.”
While earlier periods were characterized by managed constraint, Assali described a new era of violating Palestinian rights to worship. Over the course of the last 26 years, Israel has been increasingly restricting Palestinian access to their holy sites—a process Assali described as “measured steps.” In other words, Israeli policy on religion in Jerusalem is not fixed and has been growing more violent.
Tourism expert Tony Khashram insisted that tourism remains the backbone of Jerusalem’s economy and identity. But with worsening restrictions on Palestinian movement, especially domestically, tourism has been dramatically impacted. In earlier years, he said, Palestinians from the rest of the West Bank came to Jerusalem easily, but then “the checkpoints were erected, and access to Jerusalem became completely impossible.”
Khashram elaborated that tourism in Jerusalem is in a state of collapse with ongoing and expanding wars, which are causing severe domestic restrictions to access and disruptions to foreign travel. To make matters worse, Israeli religious tourism has increased in the city.
Despite these restrictions, Khashram explained how Islamic tourism has kept the city going.
Housing repeatedly emerged as an urgent priority. Hammouri argued that without housing, sumud becomes unsustainable. With real estate in the city skyrocketing, he explained that the immediate response must be the provision of grants and easy loans so people can remain.
Elias reinforced this by calling for a relaunch of an initiative associated with Faisal Husseini (see Faisal Husseini)—Buying Time in Jerusalem.
The Roundtable made clear that after 59 years of Israeli occupation, Palestinian Jerusalem is being reshaped through law, city planning, residency administration, narrative control, and economic pressure. And though hope persists, especially among youth, it is not sufficient in the absence of housing support, coordinated strategy, and vigorous cultural defense.
As the participants argued, the struggle is not only about what Israel does; it is also about whether Palestinian institutions can move from plans to execution, from fragmentation to collective action, and from endurance to sustainable life. Jerusalemites must return to the fundamentals, the participants agreed, and build the practical foundations of sumud.
The following is the full text of the Roundtable discussion. It has been edited for clarity and publication purposes.
Daoud Kuttab: How has the imposition of Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem affected life for Palestinian Jerusalemites?
Ziad Hammouri: As Jerusalemites, we have been living under Israeli law since Israel occupied East Jerusalem in 1967. Whether we liked it or not, this meant that [Arab] East Jerusalem became part of the Israeli equation, and this has affected every aspect of our lives.
A [Palestinian] Jerusalemite’s life today is tied to all of the official Israeli circles and channels—including birth, housing, health care, family life, education, and even death. Israeli authorities interfere in every detail of our lives as Palestinian Jerusalemites.
The biggest impact is on our very presence in Jerusalem, which is in danger. Today, the pressures being exerted on us are overwhelming. And the truth is, if there are no changes in the coming period, they will be very successful in achieving their goals of erasing our presence. They have already made significant progress in the Judaization of Jerusalem.
Rania Elias: I believe that 59 years of suffering under Israel’s administrative and legal system in the eastern part of Jerusalem has fundamentally altered our reality as Palestinians in this city. This was followed by other measures, most notably in 1980, when the Knesset enacted the Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, declaring the entire city, both east and west, as the unified capital of Israel.
Naturally, a great deal has changed since that decision. Despite the fact that the majority of countries and international legal bodies do not recognize Israel’s unilateral declaration, our status as Palestinians in Jerusalem has been transformed. We have been reduced to permanent residents rather than citizens of our own city. We are now considered residents whose status can be revoked at any time, allowing them to make arbitrary decisions against us. We are constantly forced to prove that our “center of life” remains within Jerusalem, which has led to the revocation of residency IDs for many people.
Since 1967, Israel has also been systematically expanding the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, which has led to the seizure of vast areas of private land, including parts of the West Bank.
Urban planning has also become a major issue. Over the years, Israel began implementing discriminatory planning policies and imposing stringent regulations that make it nearly impossible for us to obtain building permits.
With respect to education, Israel has also attempted to alter the Palestinian curriculum for years, and the battle over the content of our education continues to this day.
Daoud Kuttab: Would you argue these are policies of Judaization, Israelization, or both?
Rania Elias: Building on what Ziad said, for nearly six decades, Israel has systematically altered the city’s Palestinian national and cultural identity. They have changed street names, uprooted the pavement from Salah al-Din Street—transporting it for use in their own areas—and established cultural institutions intended to parallel and overshadow our primary Palestinian cultural institutions. More than 50 Palestinian organizations in Jerusalem have been forcibly closed.
They claim to have granted us social and economic rights, citing access to National Insurance and health services, but this comes at the expense of the heavy taxes we, as an occupied population, are forced to pay. This is called the arnona tax. Furthermore, they use the National Insurance system as a weapon—a sword hanging over our heads—if you fail to pay or cannot prove your residency, they revoke your benefits (see Health and Health Care).
Add to this the strangulation of Jerusalem: the restrictions on movement and access imposed by military checkpoints, the Separation Wall, and the complex permit regime. These 59 years have constituted a deliberate attempt to reshape the reality of Jerusalem. While the international community disputes Israel’s status in Jerusalem, Israel operates under the unilateral premise that Jerusalem is its unified capital.
This is the core of the problem: the profound, ongoing transformation that has been unfolding since 1967. You asked whether this is Judaization or Israelization. It is both. The city of Jerusalem is undergoing both a process of Judaization and systematic Israelization.
Daoud Kuttab: How would you describe the situation of the city’s holy sites today?
Khalil Assali: Before the year 2000, Israel largely abided by the Status Quo agreement regulating visitation and access to the holy sites. Jerusalemites say that in 1967, when Jerusalem was occupied and Moshe Dayan, the commander of the Israeli army at the time, entered al-Aqsa Mosque, he called upon the Palestinian religious leaders and preachers to “return to pray at al-Aqsa Mosque.”
They asked him, “How can we return when the army has already taken control of the mosque?”
He replied: “We will maintain the Status Quo there.” This meant that Israel would not interfere in the administration of al-Aqsa Mosque, providing protection and security from the outside.
This situation continued until 2000. In 2000, Ariel Sharon entered al-Aqsa Mosque, violating the Status Quo and challenging protected Palestinian Muslim rights to the site. Since then, the situation has gotten worse, with Israeli occupation forces regularly storming al-Aqsa Mosque along with extremist settlers, restricting Palestinian access to it and to the Holy Sepulchre, and even banning certain individuals from the site (see Israel Is Banning More and More Palestinian Figures from Entering al-Aqsa Mosque on Arbitrary Grounds).
Rania Elias: They have effectively transformed the political struggle into a religious one, and increasingly so each year. This is driven by the rise of religious nationalist factions and the growing influence of religious parties.
The problem is that these religious extremist factions are increasingly centering themselves in Jerusalem. They have reframed the conflict, presenting Jerusalem not merely as a political capital but as an integral part of a project with religious and biblical dimensions. We observe this clearly in both their political and religious rhetoric. When they defined it as a “nation-state for the Jewish people,” they fundamentally shifted the nature of the conflict into a religious one.
Jerusalem, of course, is at the heart of this battle and the core of the Zionist project. Having failed in all their previous attempts—culturally, historically, and politically—they have been left with the religious card to mobilize support for their ideology.
Daoud Kuttab: How has tourism in Jerusalem been impacted over the years, both domestic and international?
Tony Khashram: Before 1967, pilgrims from Arab and Islamic countries, as well as nonreligious tourists, used to come to Arab East Jerusalem in large numbers. Of course, this stopped after the occupation. Since then, pilgrims from Arab countries have not visited Jerusalem.
In 1968 and 1969, the Israeli Ministry of Tourism tried to engage with us Palestinians. They came to learn Arabic and tried to understand our industry, which helped them gradually understand how we attract tourists. They became aware of the narrative we tell. So, Israeli tour guides and service providers began crafting their own narrative, challenging and erasing the Palestinian one.
Archaeologists were important for this. They created the narrative they wanted, which is the narrative of a Jewish, Israeli Jerusalem. Tourists have been led to choose the Israeli narrative, a large part of which is related to the Holocaust, ignoring Palestinian Christian and Islamic history and heritage.
Khalil Assali: Our problem is that we don’t have a unified narrative—not historically, not culturally, not religiously. Everyone speaks from their own perspective.
Tony Khashram: The point I want to make is that the backbone of Jerusalem’s economy is tourism, and especially domestic tourism. But since 1977, this hasn’t been possible. For 59 years, domestic tourism has gradually become severely restricted. Even during the difficult circumstances of the First and Second Intifadas, the different Israeli incursions, and so on, Palestinians from the [rest of the] West Bank would manage to come to [East] Jerusalem. But today, and especially since the war on Gaza [that began October 7, 2023], this has virtually stopped. The war on Gaza and the recurring wars with Iran and Lebanon have severely affected both domestic and international tourism, especially with the airport closures.
Daoud Kuttab: What do you think should be done?
Tony Khashram: We have a surge of young people who want to work, and awareness of tourism in Jerusalem has become widespread. Everyone is talking about it. So let’s focus on youth and digitization in the tourism sector.
Daoud Kuttab: Has Islamic tourism also been affected?
Tony Khashram: Let me tell you how Islamic tourism in Jerusalem began. We were in Istanbul in 2015 for an Islamic tourism conference, and I was appointed head of the Jerusalem delegation. During our meetings, we offered to organize trips for Turkish pilgrims to visit Jerusalem on their way back from Mecca.
When the Israeli Ministry of Tourism got word of this, they coopted the project, spending hundreds of thousands of dollars to bring in Turkish pilgrims. We [Palestinian Jerusalemites] didn’t receive a single Turkish pilgrim. They landed in Ben Gurion Airport, visited al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, and were immediately returned to Tel Aviv. They didn’t even stay the night in Jerusalem. One hundred thousand Turks came to Jerusalem through the Israeli Ministry of Tourism and Israeli travel agencies.
Over time, we addressed this issue and managed to convince the Turks to come through us, which has made Islamic tourism a very important part of Jerusalem’s tourism. Of course, Islamic tourism is no longer just from Turkey. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Britain are also participating, with many Muslims from Britain coming here, especially during the last 10 days of Ramadan.
We hope that, God willing, Islamic tourism will return, but in the meantime, we still need to work hard against those exploiting tourism in the city. We must fight to keep our narrative. In the past, tourists to the city would arrive and first visit the Yad Vashem Holocaust Museum. But because of our efforts, things are now different. Now, as soon as a tourist leaves the airport or the bridge, they visit al-Aqsa Mosque first. They perform the maghrib or ‘isha prayer on their way to their hotel, and they start their next day by performing the fajr prayer.
Khalil Assali: The Turks are concerned with getting things done right. But yes, the problem is that Israeli policies are punishing those who are creating alternative narratives. For example, at one point, I published a book about Jerusalem. I couldn’t bring it into Jerusalem, but it was sold in Istanbul. Turkish pilgrims themselves started bringing 10 copies each when they came to Jerusalem.
They are prepared for the problems. They don’t want to work with Israel, and they are ready to be questioned at the airport.
Rania Elias: I would like to add that the battle in Jerusalem is distinct. While there is a genocide occurring in Gaza, in Jerusalem, a “soft genocide” is taking place across all fronts: tourism, culture, religion, economy, and education. It is an all-encompassing assault. Israel’s goal is to completely reshape the city’s geographical, demographic, political, and cultural landscape.
Backgrounder
What Is the “Status Quo”?
The Status Quo agreement on Jerusalem’s holy sites, enacted in the Ottoman era, seeks to prevent conflict between religious groups. Increasingly, it is being violated.
This is being executed through systematic planning. Massive funding is being allocated to the “five-year plan,” for example, recently introduced by the Jerusalem Municipality. We see billions of shekels being poured into these projects. The first five-year plan (Government Decision 3790, 2018–23) was allocated NIS 2.2 billion, and now the second plan (Government Decision 880, 2024–28) has been set at NIS 3.2 billion—all aimed at altering the city’s identity.
We are currently at a stage where we must reinforce sumud. There is a concerted effort to fully integrate the Palestinian Jerusalemite into the Israeli system. They are effectively turning Jerusalem into a colonial laboratory, all with the intent of reengineering our national consciousness.
In this dual process of Israelization and Judaization, they are attempting to transform the [Palestinian] Jerusalemite from an active resistor into an assimilated individual within the settler-colonial system. This is our fundamental challenge in Jerusalem: the scale of the battle for sumud against these policies.
While I agree that the [Palestinian] Jerusalemite population is politically conscious, there is a significant danger when such immense budgets and strategic plans are mobilized against us. We, as Palestinians, must have equally robust counter plans to ensure our sumud and survival.
Daoud Kuttab: Arab planning schemes exist as well, such as the Hashemite Fund and the Moroccan Jerusalem Fund. Professor Hammouri, could you tell us about these and other Palestinian planning schemes?
Ziad Hamouri: We have had several plans, but of course, none of them have been implemented. For example, the al-Anaqid plan was approved by the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Jerusalem Affairs. There is a special unit for Jerusalem within every Palestinian ministry, but technically, none of them are active, except for the unit within the Ministry of Education, which has a plan to fund schools in Jerusalem to enable them to forgo Israeli funding. This funding lasted a short while, and today, the schools that declined Israeli funding (a small percentage) are going through major financial difficulties that are threatening their ability to remain operational. An example is Dar Al-Tifel Al-Arabi (see Dar Al-Tifel Al-Arabi: Jerusalem’s Cornerstone of Culture and Education Endures despite Challenges).
So yes, all these funds exist, but the different ministries are not active and are not able to support Palestinian Jerusalemite institutions, especially schools. While money is a problem, it is also a lack of will regarding Jerusalem. As an example, the Palestinian government’s budget for Jerusalem is lower than that for villages surrounding Ramallah and Nablus, and lower than that for other cities. It’s only 1 percent of the state’s total budget. Only about $89 million is allocated to Jerusalem, and the majority goes toward education, but any single large institution in Jerusalem requires a budget of about that size.
There are many organizations and initiatives that need governmental support in Jerusalem, including medical relief, action committees, and so on. One of the projects we conducted was to provide assistance to people whose homes were demolished, at a rate of $10,000 per home. But what about someone whose home cost $200,000 or $150,000? The amount wasn’t enough. Even the Red Crescent, with its $78 million, is underfunded.
On the other hand, we see that approximately 37 to 38 percent is allocated for the holy month of Ramadan. If the Palestinian Authority (PA) were to allocate 2 to 3 percent of its security budget to Jerusalem, this would increase Jerusalemites’ morale.
Daoud Kuttab: I spoke with the mayor of Ramallah, who said: “We used to have great economic relations with Jerusalem. Now, it’s the opposite. Where is the will to strengthen the people of Jerusalem, to strengthen their steadfastness? It’s not there.”
Rania Elias: I disagree. Even the various funds established under the name of Jerusalem have not provided serious or substantial support to the people. In total, the funding likely amounts to no more than $10 or $12 million. For instance, the European Union’s (EU) contribution is roughly $2 million, which goes to Palestinian organizations. And then there are a number of Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem that maintain principled positions and refuse to accept funding from the EU, specifically because they reject the political conditions that come with that support.
Daoud Kuttab: What would you say are the most pressing issues affecting Jerusalem and that need urgent attention?
Ziad Hammouri: The first is the housing crisis. We need housing to help people stay in Jerusalem. This is a top priority. A 100 square-meter apartment today costs $800,000 to $900,000. Your average young Palestinian Jerusalemite earns around NIS 6,000 ($1,963) a month. That is not enough to live in Jerusalem, certainly not when rent is around $2,000 a month. Where are young Jerusalemites going to get this kind of money? It’s crucial that we provide them with easy loans that enable them to continue to live in their city.
Rania Elias: Yes, and I’d like to add that it is time to relaunch the initiative once championed by Faisal Husseini, Buying Time in Jerusalem. People cannot survive on thin air. They are steadfast, and they are here; they have nowhere else to go. However, resilience requires more than just existence.
There have been a million plans drawn up, and I myself have participated in more than one. But we have ended up as mere lab rats. We keep drafting plans for Jerusalem across various sectors, yet nothing is ever implemented. There have been four separate attempts at [Palestinian] sectoral planning for the city, all of which I participated in, and they have all yielded zero results.
Tony Khashram: I’d like to make two points about Jerusalem’s financial capital and the tourism sector. Where is it? It is all outside Jerusalem. All the money that used to be invested in Jerusalem for housing, industry, planning—all this is now outside Jerusalem. There are millions, and it is being spent on buying real estate in Amman and Zarqa, for example. This is our own fault, and it is a very important point.
The second point is capacity. Before 1967, we had 2,500 hotel rooms in 35 hotels. Now, we have 1,000 hotel rooms across 19 hotels. The tourism sector is a very good employer of the people of Jerusalem, and folks in other businesses—from the butcher, the baker, and the shop-owner, to the merchant, restaurant owner, and artisan—benefit from the industry indirectly. But everyone is leaving. With no housing or jobs, the people of Jerusalem—the human capital of the city—are leaving it. We need to solve this.
Khalil Assali: Jerusalem needs 4,000 housing units to address the deficit, but there are licensed housing plans that remain unbuilt. These haven’t been addressed by the Jerusalem Endowment Fund, the newly established Empowerment Fund, Beit al-Maghrib, or any other entity. This indicates a lack of seriousness, which is a fundamental point. Every project that was supposed to be funded, as Tony said, is simply a project for people who want to profit. Jerusalem needs a vision that ensures the safety of all Palestinians.
We say that Israel is the obstacle, and it is, for sure, but we are also obstructing Palestinian development. We lack unity. For example, Palestinian cultural activities are organized by institutions separately. If there were collaboration and unity among cultural organizations, the output and return would be greater.
Another issue is leadership. There are no institutions in Jerusalem that operate according to the principle of sustainability in terms of funding. The city’s political leadership leads these projects, and since Faisal Husseini, we have really lacked leadership in the city.
Rania Elias: Faisal Husseini’s significance did not lie in changing the political reality on the ground in Jerusalem. Rather, he succeeded in creating a collective and a unified cause around which all Palestinian Jerusalemites rallied. While he may not have built housing units or orchestrated any major infrastructural breakthroughs, his true achievement was mobilizing the people of Jerusalem around a shared hope for continuity.
Daoud Kuttab: Palestinian general elections are scheduled for November 2026. Can we hope for revamped leadership for Jerusalem?
Rania Elias: This is indeed a critical point. I personally do not view the elections as a viable tool for achieving genuine transformation in leadership. We are operating on fragmented territory. The PA itself lacks full sovereignty, and the representative structure is heavily constrained by geographical and security-related restrictions. How could we possibly conduct meaningful elections under these conditions? And given the unique status of Jerusalem, the ongoing Fatah-Hamas political divide, and Israel’s refusal to allow Palestinian elections to be held within the city, how can we possibly envision these elections taking place (see Representation)?
Daoud Kuttab: What about absentee voting by phone? Could this be an option for overcoming Israeli restrictions?
Rania Elias: Elections could technically be conducted in various ways, such as through digital platforms or mobile apps. However, the core problem lies in the broader political malaise in which we are currently trapped. How can we talk about elections under these conditions? Beyond that, I must admit that we have failed—at least my own generation, and I am 54. Those who came before us failed as well.
We have failed to cultivate new, young Palestinian leadership. Think about it: Who is leading us? Someone who is 90 years old, with most of the rest of the leadership in their 70s and 80s. Political factions and parties have completely failed to mobilize or inspire the youth. There is a glaring absence of educated, culturally aware, and politically conscious leadership.
The solution is clear: We must invest in our youth. In Jerusalem, a large percentage of the population is young. But how do we invest in them? Institutional projects have not worked. I have worked in that sector and understand the role of civil society, and these development and youth empowerment projects imposed by donors do not produce leaders. Historically, before the proliferation of NGOs, political parties played a vital role in mobilizing the cadres that eventually produced the leadership we have today.
Daoud Kuttab: Is the Hamas-Fatah divide and the internal Fatah crisis causing the problems in Jerusalem?
Rania Elias: It is not just that; the issue extends to all political factions, including the various leftist parties, and the overall political climate. The broader reality is that if we talk about holding elections in Jerusalem today, we must ask: Who is the current youth leadership? Could we hope for a figure who commands the same level of public approval that Faisal Husseini once did? He may not have achieved a radical structural shift, but he possessed a unique ability to build consensus. He was a unifying figure for everyone. This sense of cohesion is something we are severely lacking in Jerusalem today.
Therefore, I do not believe that elections in themselves will produce an alternative leadership. Alternative leadership must emerge organically from the realities on the ground and from within the community itself.
Tony Khashram: We are in a different stage than before. We can’t keep talking about what was and what should have been done. First of all, the youth are not aware, either politically or of the situation in Jerusalem. How do we bring them in? How do we increase their participation? This is very difficult to achieve. We must look for other solutions that are related to their reality as youth today.
I imagine the solution is through investment in steadfastness, survival, and perseverance in Jerusalem. There are no jobs in Jerusalem. Many are withdrawing and leaving, especially those who don’t have investments or assets here. The successful investment strategy in place during Faisal Husseini’s time should be working now, but it’s not. And that’s a shame because, in my opinion, business investment in Jerusalem is possible—whether buying an apartment or something similar—and especially if Palestinian Jerusalemites come together to start these projects.
We’re being squeezed out of our homeland, and Judaization is increasing, like in Jaffa, Ramla, Lydda, and Haifa. Those who are persevering are doing so because they have invested.
Ziad Hammouri: Unemployment, housing, and education are serious issues. Connected to them is the issue of national awareness. Just yesterday, I heard a schoolgirl talk about the rights of Jews in Jerusalem. When we asked her how she knew about this, she said that this is what she had learned at school in her Israeli curriculum. We must address this in order to expand Palestinian cultural and national awareness.
Rania Elias: They are distorting the truth, as they have always done, especially in the 1948 territories. Yet ’48 Palestinians have developed great awareness in spite of these distortions, because they realize how much they are under attack and control. We must aim for the same awareness in Jerusalem.
Daoud Kuttab: Would anyone like to offer final thoughts?
Tony Khashram: In terms of the tourism sector, we must work on encouraging domestic tourism to Jerusalem, whether from 1948 territories or the rest of the West Bank. Even a visit once a week will make a difference to the Palestinian shops in the Old City and those outside it.
Khalil Assali: We shouldn’t lose hope. The youth have a genuine desire to pursue national goals. They are the ones who know best how to deal with things, and they have lived this reality. As Rania said, our generation has failed in leading and offering a singular vision. The hope lies with the next generation, and we must take this opportunity to create a conscious civil society.
We must return to the basics of the issues in Jerusalem, to the beginning: What does al-Aqsa Mosque mean? What does the Damascus Gate mean? If we return to the fundamentals, we will see that we need a unified narrative, and that is through religion, regardless of party affiliation or ethnicity.
Rania Elias: I strongly believe that we must prioritize the cultural sector in Jerusalem. Israel is systematically establishing community cultural centers in the heart of Palestinian neighborhoods—on Salah al-Din Street, in Beit Hanina, and across various other locations—to erode Palestinian identity and culture, and to integrate our people into the Israeli system.
It is also imperative that we integrate our educational and cultural programs to preserve our national identity and vision. There is an ongoing distortion of the truth alongside a parallel effort to dismantle our cultural identity. Focusing on the cultural sector is an essential component of our national resilience.