Clusters of lopsided shacks, strewn together with wood, tarp, and tin alongside wheeled water tanks, solar panels, and grazing goats and sheep are a frequent sight throughout Jerusalem’s hinterland, or barriyyat in Arabic. Often nestled in the desolate hills along crowded Israeli highways like Route 60, these makeshift homes and livestock pens belong to Jerusalem’s Bedouin, a seminomadic population inhabiting the area since the early 1950s. Isolated from the Palestinian mainstream1 and the direct target of Israeli settler colonialism, they represent the very definition of sumud, as they have long faced struggles to maintain their existence and traditional way of life—such as demolitions executed by the Israeli army and relentless Israeli settler violence from the illegal settlements that surround them.

Bedouin have been inhabiting southern Palestine since the seventh century.2 During and after the 1948 War, approximately 85 percent of them fled or were expelled by Zionist militias, and thereafter Israeli forces, to Gaza, Sinai, Jordan, southern and central areas of the West Bank, and the periphery of East Jerusalem.3 Others were displaced after the 1948 War ceasefire in 1951.4 While 70 percent are classified as refugees, they have refused to live in urban camps like other Palestinian refugees out of fear they would lose their nomadic lifestyle and traditions.5 Only about 13,000 out of the estimated 50,000 to 90,000 remained in the Negev desert when Israel was established in 1948.6

Bedouin residing in the Jerusalem area originate from the Tel Erad region in the Negev, south of Hebron.7 Upon being expelled, they initially settled in the Hebron Hills. Realizing this area was not ideal for grazing their herds, they moved to the outskirts of Jerusalem, specifically near Abu Dis, Khan al-Ahmar, Nabi Musa, al-‘Izariyya, and the Jericho hills.8 In the mid-1990s, the Oslo Accords divided the West Bank so that some of it came under the partial or sole control of the Palestinian Authority (PA) (Areas A and B), and most of it under the control of the Israeli army (Area C) The map below shows the post-Oslo designation of land across the West Bank into these areas.

It is important to note that Israel has appropriated more than 60 percent of the West Bank as Area C9 and militarily occupies it, further restricting Palestinian life and existence. In recent years, the state and its agents, the settlers, have been increasingly, aggressively, and forcibly displacing Palestinians who live in Area C.10 The majority of the Bedouin-inhabited lands were either classified as Area C or within the Israeli-designated municipal boundaries of Jerusalem (see Where Is Jerusalem? The Uncertain and Unfixed Boundaries of the City). Unlike their brethren who remained in the Negev, Jerusalem Bedouin do not have Israeli citizenship; therefore, some have Israeli permanent-resident status and others are residents under the PA (see Precarious Status) who carry PA IDs.

Approximately 7,000 Bedouin live in 32 communities within the Jerusalem Governorate, which is technically controlled by the PA and covers East Jerusalem (J1) and areas of the rest of the West Bank around it (J2), extending north toward Ramallah and east to the Dead Sea (see Palestinian Jerusalem Governorate [Muhafazat al-Quds]).11 The villages are:12

These Bedouin villages are located on land that is privately owned, like in Khan al-Ahmar and Bir Nabala, which is owned by individuals in ‘Anata and Beit Hanina, respectively;18 communally owned by the villages themselves, such as where the ‘Anata Bedouin reside; owned by families in nearby towns; owned by an Islamic waqf; or appropriated as state land by Israel even though it is in the occupied West Bank.19 Israel relies on an 1858 Ottoman-era land law to confiscate land by declaring it as state property if it has not been cultivated for several consecutive years or by declaring the area a firing zone for the Israeli military to use (see Land).20 More than 30 percent of land in the occupied West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) is suitable for grazing but not arable, meaning it cannot be cultivated.21 Grazing and farming land once available to Bedouin has shrunk significantly due to Israel’s designation of large swathes of land as closed military zones, ongoing settlement expansion, and the expropriation of land to build Israel’s Separation Wall (see The Separation Wall).22 These issues will be discussed further below.

The vast majority of Bedouin in Jerusalem belong to the al-Jahalin tribe, while the rest belong to the Ka’abneh, al-Sawahira,23 and al-Azazmeh tribes.24 The tribes are divided into clans. Al-Jahalin is composed of three clans—Abu Dahouk, Salamat, and Saray’a—and each clan is broken up into different families. In the Jerusalem area, al-Hjouj, Kurshan, Abu Falah, and Bo’ran branches make up the Abu Dahouk clan, who mainly reside in Khan al-Ahmar and al-Muntar. The Salamat clan resides in Jabal al-Baba and Wadi al-A‘waj. The largest clan, the Saray’a, is made up of the Ara’ra, Hathalin, Tabaneh, and Foqara branches, and reside in Wadi Abu Hindi and Jabal al-Baba.25

When Bedouin first moved to the Jerusalem area, their homes were tents made out of woven goat hair. Today, they are mostly shacks secured with wooden and metal poles that feature open, unsecured doors and windows. Each home is usually demarcated by a wooden or wire fence.26 Most are not connected to electricity grids that provide public access and instead use expensive generators or donor-funded solar panels for their electrical needs.27

Families are often large—comprising 6 to 10 children. Men may have two or more wives, so children may number over 20. Marriage within the same family, clan, or tribe is common and preferred.28

Traditionally, Bedouin are herders and farmers and rely on the animal products and produce they cultivate to generate income. However, from the 1970s on, Israeli authorities increasingly pressured Bedouin communities to integrate into Palestinian urban areas.29 This pressure comes in the form of shrinking the available agricultural land for Bedouin: Israel has illegally categorized approximately 18 percent of West Bank land as firing zones30 and 16 percent as state property on which settlements can be built.31

In 2000, at the beginning of the Second Intifada, the Israeli military intensified its crackdown on Palestinians in the West Bank by tightening movement restrictions and closing off Jerusalem to the Palestinian population. Thus, Bedouin lost access to a significant marketplace where they had traditionally sold their goods.32

Consistent settler attacks on grazing herds have also impacted Bedouin livelihoods in recent years. Since 2022, Israeli settler violence emerging from shepherding outposts has ballooned against the adjacent Bedouin communities. For example, in July 2026, Israeli settlers established an outpost 500 meters from Ma’azi Jaba‘.33 The settlers’ goal is to drive out the Palestinian shepherds, and they do this by attacking and stealing their livestock and destroying their water infrastructure.34 Intensifying settler attacks have pushed Bedouin to cease grazing their herds and instead rely on expensive fodder and water tanks as opposed to traditional methods. The communities of Khan al-Ahmar, Jaba‘, and Mikhmas, in particular, have experienced settler violence at a greater intensity and frequency. For instance, in December 2025 and January 2026, settlers from the adjacent Kol Mevaser outpost torched homes and vehicles in Mikhmas.35

Amid all these difficulties, approximately 84 percent of the Bedouin herders receive local and international aid to supplement their income.36 Furthermore, given their refugee status, some Bedouin are registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and rely on this agency for their health-care needs, while others carry insurance supported by the Palestinian Authority.37 However, most communities lack health clinics and onsite physicians, meaning Bedouin must travel to nearby towns or cities to receive emergency and even basic care.38

The location of these communities also makes it difficult to access services. The Bedouin villages are often isolated from urban areas and situated away from public roads and transportation. For example, Khan al-Ahmar residents travel to Jericho (approximately 11 miles away) for health services, because the al-Eslah mobile clinic only comes monthly to provide medical treatment to the residents.39

While Palestinians are considered one of the most educated populations in the region with a literacy rate of 97.7 percent,40 Palestinian Bedouin face significant challenges to obtaining education. Few Bedouin villages have schools, and those that do—like Khan al-Ahmar—are continually threatened by demolition by the Israeli authorities. Instead, most students travel to nearby towns for their education. Over 80 percent of Bedouin families cannot afford the transportation costs, so the majority of students walk long distances to reach their classes.41 Students from Bir al-Maskub need to walk three and a half miles each way to attend school.42 While the commute becomes treacherous in winter with the possibility of floods, it is dangerous all year round because of escalating settler attacks, specifically in Khan al-Ahmar where settlers from nearby illegal outposts throw stones at students walking to school. Given the cost and commute conditions, many Bedouin drop out of school and rarely complete their undergraduate studies. The issue is exacerbated for women, who are often pulled out of school at a young age over concerns regarding their safety when traveling to school.43

Planning discrimination against Bedouin began during Jordanian rule from 1948 to 1967. During this time, the Hashemite Kingdom maintained Colonial British Mandate-era planning regulations, which followed a hierarchy divided into three authorities: the Higher Planning Council, District Planning Commissions, and Local Planning Commissions.44

Under this system, Bedouin villages were technically part of planning efforts through the District and Local Planning Commissions, but these offices were located in town centers, away from Bedouin communities, thereby making Bedouin planning concerns and needs an afterthought for planning authorities.45

Additionally, the Jordanian system of planning did not recognize Bedouin land rights and instead classified Bedouin lands as state property. This problem remains today, insofar as the Israeli planning system also ignores traditional land ownership claims in favor of formalized state enforcement mechanisms in regard to land governance,46 even though the land is not in Israel proper but rather in the areas of the West Bank that fall outside East Jerusalem. Designating Bedouin areas as nature reserves or state land makes it easier for Israeli authorities to then advance settler plans and displace Bedouin communities.47

In 1975, plans to establish an Israeli settlement in Khan al-Ahmar started to materialize, first with the appropriation of 30,000 dunams (7,400 acres) of land belonging to the al-Jahalin and al-Sawahira tribes to build an illegal settlement industrial zone (see Settlements). In 1979, Israel declared the area a military zone. By 1984, the government approved a settlement plan for what became known as the Ma‘ale Adumim bloc, covering Khan al-Ahmar and its surrounding communities.48

With the construction of the Ma‘ale Adumim settlement and its subsequent expansions, 150 al-Jahalin Bedouin families were displaced in three waves from 1997 to 2007 to al-Jabal, outside of al-‘Izariyya and adjacent to a Jerusalem Municipality landfill.49 Today, Khan al-Ahmar, al-Muntar, and Bir al-Maskub are surrounded not only by Ma‘ale Adumim but also the settlements of Alon and Kedar. Israel has also confiscated other Bedouin land, such as part of the village of Ras Shihada in 1991 to build the Pisgat Ze’ev settlement.50

Following the forcible transfer of al-Jahalin families, the Israeli military issued a demolition order for Khan al-Ahmar’s school in 2009, just a month after it was built. That same year, surrounding Israeli settlements called on the Israeli government to enact the demolition orders it issued for hundreds of structures in Khan al-Ahmar.51 Israel issued demolition orders for buildings in Khan al-Ahmar because they were constructed without Israeli building permits. Even though Khan al-Ahmar is part of the West Bank, the Israeli government gave itself military control over it by declaring it Area C, and by extension, control over development in the area.52

The following year, the Israeli government announced a plan to forcibly remove the community of Khan al-Ahmar. Over the next eight years, Khan al-Ahmar and Israeli settlers from the Regavim organization, which was cofounded by Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, engaged in a court battle, with the latter petitioning Israel’s Supreme Court to demolish and expel the community.53 In 2018, the Supreme Court green-lighted Khan al-Ahmar’s expulsion to al-Jabal. However, overwhelming international pressure has largely staved off their displacement until May 2026, when Smotrich ordered the evacuation of Khan al-Ahmar in response to the International Criminal Court’s request to issue an arrest warrant against him.54

Israel's E1 Development Plan, which seeks to expand and connect Ma‘ale Adumim to Jerusalem, has put Khan al-Ahmar and the rest of the Bedouin communities located east of Jerusalem under imminent threat. This plan has been in the works since the 1990s;55 however, it was not until 2012 that Israel began to make movement on the plan in response to the UN General Assembly’s recognition of the State of Palestine.56 If implemented, this project will displace 3,000 Bedouin.57 Between 2009 and 2020, Israel has destroyed 315 structures to make way for the E1 Plan.58 Some Bedouin villages will become isolated enclaves, while others, like Bir al-Maskub, will be totally demolished in order to relocate the al-Za‘ayim checkpoint (see Checkpoints, Part 1) eastward, thereby creating a continuous Israeli space from Ma‘ale Adumim to Jerusalem. Many Palestinians currently use the al-Za‘ayim checkpoint to enter East Jerusalem. Israel intends to move the checkpoint to Mishor Adumim, a settler industrial zone southeast of Bir al-Maskub, which will absorb the Bedouin village into Israeli-controlled territory.

While the E1 Plan was proposed in 1994, its approval was stalled for decades because of pressure from the international community.59 However, in August 2025, the Israeli Higher Planning Council approved nearly 4,000 housing units in settlements near Ma‘ale Adumim.60 And in what appears to be another transfer plan, Israel initiated a project in March 2026 to expand al-Jabal by 950 housing units in multistory buildings on a steep hill not suitable for the agricultural lifestyle of Bedouin. While the construction is unlikely, given the challenging topography, rights groups say the planned expansion is meant to justify the expulsion of the rest of Jerusalem’s Bedouin, with Israel’s government asserting they can displace the community from the E1 area because they have a proposed relocation site.61

Instead of resisting, the looming threat of displacement has had the opposite effect on the Bedouin in Jerusalem’s periphery. Researchers from Al-Quds Human Rights Clinic (AQHRC) found that historically young Palestinian men are absent from the political scene and not openly protesting against their forcible expulsion.62 According to AQHRC, this lack of activism is due to heightened fears of Israeli retaliation against the Bedouin villages. For instance, Israeli authorities could try to squelch Bedouin political participation by demolishing homes, expelling communities, or canceling work permits.63 While Israel has largely frozen permits for Palestinian workers since October 7, 2023 (see Palestinians from the West Bank Endanger Their Lives Seeking Work), some have since been reinstated, specifically in Israeli settlements. Many Bedouin men have sought work in nearby Israeli settlements, since their agricultural livelihood is no longer feasible due to Israeli movement restrictions and settler violence affecting where and when they can graze their livestock.64

Israel has long employed a significant system of suppression against Palestinian mobilization and resistance. And for vulnerable communities like the Bedouin in Area C of the occupied West Bank, these suppression tactics are highly effective when these groups’ livelihoods are so intertwined with the Israeli legal system and economy.

For the majority of their time in the Jerusalem barriyyat, Bedouin have faced hurdles in maintaining their way of life amid Israeli demolitions, movement restrictions, and settler attacks. Despite the struggles, Bedouin always found a way to remain in their villages. Today, their survival hangs in the balance as the Israeli state advances the illegal E1 Plan, and Israeli settlers increasingly make Bedouin life unbearable.65

Researcher and Writer: Jessica Buxbaum
Editors: Jerusalem Story Team